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 Dominant Forms of Corporate Control in
 the U.S. Agribusiness Sector
 Julie A. Caswell
 Two forms of control over corporate decision making are analyzed: direct control
 through stockholding and network control through interlocking boards of directors. A
 majority of the 222 large agribusiness firms studied had strong direct control by
 owners or cooperatives, while the largest firms lacked such control. Tests relating
 direct control type to level of network control exposure show that strong direct
 control is associated with weak network control and vice versa, with firm size being
 the major factor in explaining both types of control. For the largest firms,
 network-based rather than direct control appears to limit management discretion.
 Key words: agribusiness, corporate control, management, network analysis.
 The evident spread of managerial control
 among large U.S. corporations in the fifty
 years since Berle and Means' initial study has
 prompted extensive theoretical and empirical
 study of the effect of type of corporate control
 on firm performance and aggregate concentra-
 tion. Models of firm behavior under manage-
 ment control have predicted that these firms
 may have lower profits and greater organiza-
 tional slack, put sales growth before profit
 growth, and/or seek the quiet life of low risk,
 status quo operations (Williamson, Baumol,
 Marris). Empirical evidence on these effects is
 mixed. For example, while several studies
 show lower profit rates for managerially con-
 trolled firms, others, including the most care-
 fully specified test, show no significant differ-
 ence between control types (Scherer, p. 39).
 However, the reliability of these findings
 hinges on control data and classifications that
 vary widely in quality.
 Corporate control patterns may affect
 aggregate concentration by reducing the inde-
 pendence of decision making in firms with
 strong ties to outside centers of power. This
 effect was recognized in the debate preceding
 passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, although
 the scope of Section 8 was ultimately limited
 to outlawing interlocking directors between
 direct competitors (Halverson). Corporate
 control patterns may also have a dynamic ef-
 fect on aggregate concentration if they in-
 fluence the internal and merger growth rates of
 large firms.
 The potential impacts of corporate control
 on firm-level efficiency and quality of decision
 making argue for the development of accurate
 data on its dominant forms in the economy
 and its sectors.1 In the agribusiness sector, the
 relevant universe for measuring dominant
 forms of corporate control includes the large
 public, private, and cooperative firms. A uni-
 verse including 222 of these large firms oper-
 ating in 1976 is used in this analysis. Two
 separate avenues of corporate control are
 investigated: direct control over firm decision
 making through stockholding and network
 control exercised through interlocking mem-
 bership on boards of directors. In this concep-
 tual framework, corporate control is the
 power to determine the broad policies, objec-
 tives, and business strategies of the firm. It is
 exercised through controlling the decision-
 making hierarchy of the firm, in particular the
 board of directors, which in turn controls the
 internal organization of the firm.
 The first avenue of corporate control re-
 flects the familiar notion that actual owner-
 ship of the firm or a significant interest in
 it usually confers decision-making control.
 Julie A. Caswell is an assistant professor, Department of Agricul-
 tural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts.
 The author wishes to thank W. F. Mueller and two anonymous
 referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
 1 Most previous studies have investigated corporate control for
 broad cross sections of the largest firms in the economy instead of
 by sector as occurs here. The exceptions are U.S. Congress (Sen-
 ate), Ware, and Schulman who used the Corporate Data Exchange
 data set.
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 Large, modern firms are also subject to the
 influence (and possible control) of other en-
 tities that have a stake in the firm's operations
 even if they are not significant stockholders.
 These include financial institutions, suppliers,
 buyers, regional interests, and others. Re-
 search seeking to quantify this second avenue
 of control has focused on seats held on the
 firm's board of directors by representatives of
 other firms. Such representation has been per-
 vasive and stable over time in the United
 States (Dooley, Allen, Mizruchi). Network
 control indexes are used to measure the levels
 and patterns of this contact in order to assess
 its effect on corporate control.
 Before proceeding, the application of net-
 work analysis to corporate control is briefly
 discussed. Network analysis is emerging as
 the primary conceptual framework and set of
 empirical methods in the social sciences for
 analyzing complex sets of relational data
 (Knoke and Kuklinski). Its development was
 motivated by the limitations of trying to
 understand economic and social phenomena
 solely by studying the attributes of individual
 actors apart from their relationships with
 other actors. This would be analogous to
 evaluating the profit performance of a cereal
 manufacturer by studying only its own size,
 cost structure, and other attributes while ig-
 noring similar attributes of its competitors,
 their business strategies, and other market
 factors. As this example indicates, neither the
 attribute nor relational approach alone is
 likely to yield a satisfactory understanding of
 economic or social phenomena (Knoke and
 Kuklinski, p. 10).
 The size of direct stockholdings is an attri-
 bute of the firm that explains its type of corpo-
 rate control. While previous studies have
 stopped here in analyzing control (Schulman,
 Kotz, Larner, Berle and Means), such an anal-
 ysis remains incomplete because the relational
 context of board representation is ignored.
 The empirical techniques of network analysis
 are applied here to relational data on board
 representation in order to qualify and clarify
 conclusions drawn from a simple attribute or
 stockholding-based analysis of corporate con-
 trol.
 The Study's Data Base
 The sample of 222 agribusiness firms and the
 stockholding data base were constructed by
 the Corporate Data Exchange (CDE) in pub-
 lishing its Stock Owne ship Directory-
 Agribusiness. The sample firms repre ent the
 leading agricultural input manufacturers (ma-
 chinery, feed, chemicals), cooperatives (sup-
 ply and ma keting), food manufacturers, res-
 ta rant chains, wholesalers, and retailers in
 the United States in 1976.2 Nearly three-
 fourths of them are large, with operating reve-
 ues greater than $500 million, while 50%
 have operating revenues greater than $1 bil-
 li n. The CDE directory lists all voters of at
 least 0.2% of a company's stock as of 31 De-
 c mber 1976 for the 153 widely traded firms in
 the sample and all major holders in the remain-
 ing 69 firms.
 The directory is used in two ways in this
 study: (a) to classify individual firms under
 categories of direct control based on the size
 of their largest stockholdings and (b) to define
 the limits of the network of firms and institu-
tions that are included in the analysis of board
 representation. The relevant network is the
 222 agribusiness firms and any other firms or
 institutions that might seek to control or in-
 fluence them through board representation.
 While this latter group might include any or-
 ganization in the economy, the network is lim-
 t d to all organizations that have displayed an
nterest in the sector through stockholdings of
 any size in the sample agribusiness firms. The
 CDE stockholding directory is used to identify
216 such organizations. Twenty-seven For-
 tune Top 50 commercial banks and life insur-
 ance companies that were not agribusiness
 stockholders are also included in order to
 comprehensively cover these types of firms.
 S nce data on board membership for 10 of the
 agribusiness firms could not be found, the net-
 work studied contains 455 firms.3
 The data set on board representation for the
 network analysis was constructed by coding
 the company, name, and position held for the
 officers and directors of the 455 companies.
 This set contained nearly 12,000 listings.
 Names were then matched to generate records
 o  company contacts through individuals using
 2 Representative firms include Deere and Ciba-Geigy (inputs);
 Agway and Sunkist (cooperatives); Beatrice, American Bakeries,
 and Gallo Winery (food manufacturers); McDonald's and Howard
 Johnson (restaurant chains); Super Valu and Wetterau (wholesal-
 ers); and Safeway and Lucky (retailers). A complete list of the
 sample firms is available from the author.
 3 Of the 10 excluded agribusiness firms, 7 were privately owned
 (6 domestic and 1 foreign), 2 were cooperatives, and 1 was a
 foreign, publicly owned firm. A complete list of the 455 network
 firms is available from the author.
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 biographical sources for confirmation when
 needed. The aggregation of these records is
 discussed in the network control section.
 Direct Corporate Control
 Dominant forms of corporate control through
 stockholding are evaluated by classifying each
 of the agribusiness firms under eight catego-
 ries of direct control based on the identity of
 the leading stockholder(s) and the strength of
 its stockholding(s). The categories of control
 are as follows:
 Full owner. Control is held by an individual,
 a family, or a group of individuals (e.g., a part-
 nership). This category includes privately held
 firms.
 Partial owner. Shared control is held by one
 or more owners.
 Full financial. Control is held by a bank,
 insurance company, or other financial in-
 stitution.
 Partial financial. Shared control is held by
 one or more financial institutions.
 Miscellaneous. Control is held by a nonfi-
 nancial firm outside the agribusiness sample.
 This category also includes one case of church
 control.
 Mixed. Shared control is held by more than
 one of the above types of stockholders.
 Cooperative. Control is jointly held by the
 members of the cooperative.
 No-identified-center-of-control. Firm does
 not fall into any of the above categories.
 The label "no-identified-center-of-control" is
 more accurate than the commonly used "man-
 agement control" because as a residual this
 category also includes firms where centers of
 control exist but were not discovered because
 of a lack of information.
 The criteria for categorizing firms under one
 of the above types of direct control are
 adapted from those Kotz used in studying con-
 trol over the top 200 nonfinancial corporations
 in the United States. They rely on a combina-
 tion of the identity of the leading stockhold-
 er(s), the size of the leading stockholding(s),
 whether the stockholder(s) has seats on the
 board of directors, and the relative size and
 distribution of other holdings in the firm. The
 criteria distinguish between full and partial
 control. Full control presumably gives the
 stockholder unchallenged direction over the
 corporation, while partial control indicates a
 strong but shared voice in corporate decision
 making. A firm is classi ied under the full or
 partial control of a particular stockholder if
 that holder meets one of these criteria:
 Full Control
 (a) Stockholder has the largest holding, this
 holding is - 10%, and no other holding is - 60% of the largest holding.
 (b) Stockholder has the largest holding, this
 holding is - 5%, stockholder has strong repre- sentation on the company's board, and no
 other holding is - 5%. Partial Control
 (a) Stockholder has the largest holding, this
 holding is - 10%, and another holding(s) is - 60% of the largest holding.
 (b) Stockholder has a holding - 4% and no
 other holding is - 10%.4 (c) Stockholder is not the largest holder but
 has a holding > 60% of the largest holding
 over 10%.
 Based on the identity of the holder (e.g.,
 family, financial institution), the firm is then
 placed into one of the eight categories listed
 above. Strong representation is defined as
 having two people on the board of directors or
 one person serving on the board's finance or
 executive committee. Representation is used
 to qualify the strength of smaller holdings
 rather than to measure network control as in
 the following section. Under these definitions,
 full control can be held by only one stock-
 holder while partial control may be held by
 more than one. Firms that are controlled by
 other companies in the agribusiness sample
 are classified according to who exercises ulti-
 mate control over the set of connected firms.
 Stockholdings of 4%-10% or even 20% may
 seem too small to imply corporate control.
 However, because of the wide dispersion of
 stockholding in large corporations, such levels
 of holdings are considered to imply a control
 capability (Kotz, Burch, Schulman). Recent
 experience with takeover attempts, particu-
 larly in the oil industry, underscores the threat
 to corporate management of control over
 holdings of these sizes. The federal govern-
 ment's routine reporting requirements for ac-
 cumulations of stock in a company also recog-
 nize a 5% holding as a benchmark.
 The pattern of direct control in the ag-
 ribusiness sector in late 1976 is presented in
 4 A 4% rather than a 5% lower limit on stockholding size is used
 for partial control in order to include holdings kept just under 5%.
 This avoids the stock-trading reporting requirements that become
 effective at the 5% level.
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 Table 1. Direct Stockholder Control over Large Agribusiness Firms, 1976
 Type of Number
 Direct Control of Firms Firms Assetsa Assets
 (%) ($ millions) (%)
 1. Full owner 95 42.8 77,931.2 32.7
 2. Partial owner 17 7.7 14,541.0 6.1
 3. Full financial 6 2.7 8,215.5 3.4
 4. Partial financial 18 8.1 32,234.8 13.5
 5. Agr. cooperatives 27 12.2 6,447.9 2.7
 6. Miscellaneous 5 2.3 2,237.4 0.9
 7. ixed 11 5.0 3,868.7 1.6
 8. No-identified-center 43 19.4 92,805.9 38.9
 Total 222 100.0 238,282.4 100.0
 Summary of Control
 Owner (1 + 2) 112 50.5 92,472.2 38.8
 Financial (3 + 4) 24 10.8 40,450.3 17.0
 Agr. cooperatives (5) 27 12.2 6,447.9 2.7
 Miscellaneous or mixed (6 + 7) 16 7.2 6,106.1 2.6
 No-identified-center (8) 43 19.4 92,805.9 38.9
 Total 222 100.0 238,282.4 100.0
 a Asset figures are from Stock Ownership Directory-Agribusiness (Corporate Data Exchange); annual reports; Directory of the 200
 Largest U.S. Food and Tobacco Firms (Connor and Mather); and Moody's Industrial Manual. Asset figures were estimated for 19 firms,
 17 of which were owner controlled, by applying the average operating revenues to total assets ratio for firms in similar lines of business to
 the estimated firm's operating revenues. The asset distribution without this adjustment shows owner control of 36.8% and no-identified-
 center-of-control of 40.3%.
 table 1. The top portion categorizes the firms
 by type of control. The lower portion of the
 table summarizes these findings into five cate-
 gories. Full and partial owner control account
 for 112 firms or 50.5% of the number of firms.
 The category no-identified-center-of-control is
 next in importance with 43 firms (19.4%). Fi-
 nancial and cooperative contol have similar
 importance accounting for 10.8% and 12.2%,
 respectively. Miscellaneous and mixed con-
 trol account for the remaining 7.2% of firms.
 Owner and no-identified-center-of-control
 have equal importance when percentage of as-
 sets in each category is considered. Thus
 owner control is less important in terms of as-
 sets held than number of firms (39% versus
 51%), while firms with no-identified-center-of-
 control are much more important in assets
 held than number of firms (39% versus 19%).
 Financially controlled firms are also more im-
 portant in assets controlled than in number of
 firms (17% versus 11%). Miscellaneous,
 mixed, and cooperatively controlled firms are
 less important in assets controlled than in
 number of firms. This evidence of size differ-
 ences between firms under the various types
 of direct control is supported by t-tests. These
 tests (not reported here) show that the mean
 size of firms with no-identified-center-of-
 control and financially controlled firms are not
 significantly different, while both are signifi-
 cantly larger than owner controlled firms.
 Cooperatives are significantly smaller than
 firms under the other three types of direct con-
 trol. The miscellaneous and mixed category is
 excluded from this and subsequent tests be-
 cause it includes diverse control situations for
 which group averages are not meaningful.
 Allowing for differences in control criteria,
 paired comparisons of these results to those of
 Schulman, Herman, Kotz, and Burch show
 similar distributions of control types for those
 agribusiness firms included in both studies.5
 Major differences appear, however, in overall
 distributions of control types between some of
 the studies. For samples of the largest 200
 nonfinancial firms in 1974 and 1969, respec-
 tively, Herman and Kotz found a much higher
 incidence of firms with management or no-
 identified-center-of-control and a much lower
 incidence of owner control than is found here.
 This difference can be attributed to the smaller
 size of the majority of the firms in the ag-
 ribusiness sample. In contrast, Burch's study
 of the top 500 industrials in 1965, which in-
 cluded a comparable range of firm sizes, found
 a similar overall distribution of control types.
 5 The agribusiness sample has 38 firms in common with Her-
 man, 41 with Kotz, and 90 with Burch. Schulman used the same
 sample and his overall distribution of control types is similar to
 that found here.
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 These comparisons indicate that among ag-
 ribusiness firms smaller than those included in
 the sample owner control is likely to be the
 predominant form of direct control. A similar
 relationship between distributions of firm size
 and control type could be expected in other
 sectors of the economy. In the agribusiness
 sector, the dominant forms of direct stock-
 holding control among large firms are owner
 and no-identified-center-of-control. The ma-
 jority of these firms are under owner control,
 while the largest have no-identified-center-of-
 control. If those firms with no-identified-
 center are all under management control, then
 about 40% of the sector's economic activity
 takes place in firms where management is free
 from direct control. This decision-making
 freedom is tempered, however, by control ex-
 ercised through board representation by out-
 siders with a minor or no stockholding interest
 in the firm. This second avenue of control is
 addressed in the next section.
 Network Corporate Control
 The practice of officers and directors of one
 corporation or institution sitting on the board
 of another establishes a network of contacts
 between them. The degree of outside influence
 or control over a firm is based on the number
 and stength of their contacts. In this section,
 centrality scores are calculated for each of the
 455 firms in the network as indexes of control
 through board representation. This measure
 was developed for analyzing interlocking di-
 rectorates by researchers at SUNY-Stony
 Brook (see, e.g., Bearden et al., Mariolis,
 Mizruchi, Mintz and Schwartz). In contrast to
 the direct control results, this application of
 network analysis does not link individual firms
 to specific centers of control; rather it mea-
 sures a firm's exposure to outside influences.
 Under the SUNY-Stony Brook model, the
 centrality scores for the firms in the network
 are calculated by a set of 455 simultaneous
 equations, one for each firm. A firm's cen-
 trality is a weighted summation of the inten-
 sity of its board interlocks with other firms
 where the weights are the centrality scores of
 the interlocking firms. The general form of the
 centrality measure for firm i is
 N
 Ci = rij * cj, j= 1
 i#j
 where rij is intensity of the link between firm i
 andj, cj is centrality of firmj, and N is number
 of firms in network. The weights allow for
 links with different degrees of importance. A
 highly interconnected firm has a relatively
 high centrality score (e.g., Chase Manhattan).
 A link to a high scoring firm ties a firm more
 closely into the network than a link to a low
 scoring firm (e.g., First National Bank-
 Akron). This disproportionate effect is
 reflected as a higher centrality score for the
 firm.
 The data used to measure the intensity of
 linkage (r1j) between two firms are the records
 of company-to-company interlocks through
common board membership described above
 in the data section. These records are ag-
 gregated to yield two measures of the intensity
 of intercompany links. Each measure in turn
 defines a separate network. In the first, the full
 network, rij is defined as
 bij
 where bij is number of board members in com-
 mon, di is number of members on board of firm
 i, and dj is number of members on board of
 firm j. The number of interlocking directors
 between the two firms is in the numerator,
 while the denominator controls for the poten-
 tial number of interlockers from each firm.6
 The full network centrality score of a firm
 based on this definition of rij is a measure of
 the number and intensity of all its board links
 to other firms.
 In the strong directional network a second,
 more stringent definition of network influence
 is used for the rij measure. First, rij counts
 only board interlocks made by an officer of
 one of the interlocked corporations. These
 strong officer ties represent a conscious deci-
 sion by the two corporations to establish a for-
 mal link. In contrast, ties made by non-officers
 may simply reflect the tendency of some indi-
 viduals to sit on multiple boards.
 Second, rij is defined so that the firm send-
 ing the interlock (the officer's home firm) gets
 most of the increase in centrality scores due to
 the link; the receiving firm gets the balance.
 6 Theoretically, r0 ranges from 0 (no interlocks) to 1 (identical boards). However, the maximum number of common board mem-
 bers (bo) counted between firms was 3 for the full network and 1.5 for the strong directional network that follows. This modification
 arises from rare cases in which an unusually high number of inter-
 locks between a pair of companies gives them exaggerated cen-
 trality scores.
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 Table 2. Network Characteristics of Large Agribusiness Firms by Direct Control Type, 1976
 Interlocked Isolates Centrality
 Type of Total
 Direct Control Number Number Percenta Number Percenta Mean S.D.b
 Full Network:
 Owner 105 76 72.4 29 27.6 .035 .055
 Financial 23 23 100.0 0 0.0 .107 .088
 Cooperative 25 11 44.0 14 56.0 .001 .002
 No-identified-center 43 40 93.0 3 7.0 .137 .186
 Miscellaneous 5 5 100.0 0 0.0 .041 .032
 Mixed 11 8 72.7 3 27.3 .034 .049
 Total 212 163 76.9 49 23.1 .060 .107
 Strong Directional Network:
 Owner 105 62 59.0 43 41.0 .029 .079
 Financial 23 22 95.7 1 4.3 .101 .110
 Cooperative 25 10 40.0 15 60.0 .006 .014
 No-identified-center 43 38 88.4 5 11.6 .111 .205
 Miscellaneous 5 5 100.0 0 0.0 .038 .064
 Mixed 11 8 72.7 3 27.3 .082 .243
 Total 212 145 68.4 67 31.6 .054 .131
 a Row percentage.
 b Standard deviation.
 This definition recognizes that the direction of
 the interlock indicates the flow of influence
 between the two corporations. Thus, both the
 strength and direction of each tie are consid-
 ered in assessing a firm's exposure to outside
 influence. The denominator again controls for
 board size.
 Formally, in the strong directional network
 rij is defined as
 Ws * Si + W, * Tij rijr i
 where Sij is number of officers of firm i who sit
 on board of firm j (sending), Tij is number of
 officers of firm j who sit on board of firm i
 (receiving), Ws is weight of sender, Wr is
 weight of receiver, and W, + Wr is 1. Follow-
 ing Bearden et al. and Mizruchi the Ws and Wr
 weights are set at .9 and .1, respectively.
 The 455 centrality equations for each of the
 two networks comprise a set of simultaneous
 equations in the atrix form:
 C = RC
 where C is an N x 1 vector of centrality
 scores and R is an N x N correlation matrix
 of the full or strong directional overlap mea-
 sure rj. The system of equations C = RC, or
 (R - I)C = 0, has a nonzero solution only
 under the unlikely condition that det(R - I)
 = 0. But Bonacich shows that multiplying the
 left side by a constant A, does not violate the
 spirit of the model and allows a solution to the
 equations. The system XC = RC is solved by
 finding eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Here, h
 is chosen to equal the largest eigenvalue; the
 elements of its related eigenvector are the cen-
 trality scores.' Since the system has one more
 unknown than equations, the actual values of
 the centrality scores are arbitrary. The scores
 are chosen so that the most central firm has a
 score of 1.0; therefore, the scores range from 0
 to 1.0.
 Data on the number of interlocked versus
 isolated companies among the 212 ag-
 ribusiness firms in the network as well as
 mean centrality scores are presented in table 2
 by type of direct control. For the full network,
 interlocking occurs among 100% of the
 financially controlled firms, 93% of the firms
 with no-identified-center-of-control, 72% of
 the owner-controlled firms, and 44% of the
 7 There will be as many other eigenvectors with the same sign as
 there are other discrete components of the network (i.e., groups of
 firms that are related to each other but are not related to the main
 cluster of firms); however, these eigenvectors are not used in the
 analysis. Firms in the main cluster represented by the first eigen-
 vector will have positive centrality scores, while those firms that
 belong to other clusters or that are isolates (are related to no firms)
 will have scores of 0. Bonacich's proof of this approach is for
 symmetric R matrices. Following procedures developed by Bear-
 den et al. and Mizruchi, the approach was applied to the asym-
 metric R matrix in the strong directional network on the basis of
 its acceptable accuracy in calculating centrality scores.
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 cooperatives.8 The firms with no-identified-
 center-of-control have the highest mean cen-
 trality score (.137) followed by the financially
 controlled firms (.107). The owner-controlled
 firms have a much lower mean score (.035),
 while the cooperatives' mean score is near 0.
 Both the number of interlocked firms and
 mean centrality scores follow the same pattern
 in the strong directional network. The lower
 percentages of interlocked firms reflect the
 greater selectivity of this network.
 Relationship between Network and Direct
 Control
 These results show several marked differ-
 ences in number of interlocked firms and mean
 centrality scores by type of direct control.
 How do these results clarify and qualify the
 findings reported above on dominant forms of
 direct control for agribusinesses? Recall that
 the majority of large agribusiness firms are
 under direct owner control, while the largest
 have no-identified-center-of-control. Earlier
 studies have concluded from similar evidence
 that an important segment of large firms are
 independent of outside control and are, in
 fact, management controlled (Burch, Larner,
 Berle and Means). In this section, the extent
 of that independence is explored.
 In general, it is hypothesized that strong
 forms of direct control are associated with
 weak network control and vice versa. To illus-
 trate: owner control, which is strong direct
 control, likely is associated with weak net-
 work control for two reasons. First, the own-
 ers who control the board selection process
 will tend to appoint outside directors who rep-
 resent the owners' interests. Second, these
 firms are less vulnerable to pressure for board
 representation from outsiders who control im-
 portant resources, especially capital. This
 lower vulnerability is due to the owners' abil-
 ity to control the firm's policies, including the
 internal generation of equity capital. Thus, the
 outside directors of owner-controlled firms are
 less likely to be associated with the large
 financial firms and others that make up the
 network within which interlocking is mea-
 sured. As a result, low levels of interlocking
 and centrality scores are expected.
 The cooperative form also implies strong di-
 rect control and likely is associated with weak
 network influence. Cooperative board mem-
 bership is generally limited to the farmers who
 own the cooperative, provide its capital, and
 use its services, and to cooperative managers
 and adviso s. This limitation suggests low
 levels of interlocking and centrality scores.
 Firms with no-identified-center-of-control
 represent the reverse of this hypothesis. In
 th se firms, weak direct control likely is asso-
 ciated with strong network control. These
 firms lack the protection from interference
 provided by a large controlling stockholder.
 They are likely to depend more on the opinion
 of the investment community for the mainte-
 nance of their stock prices and on large
 financial firms for the provision of their debt
 capital. The price of such support is often
 board representation and a voice in decision
 making. Thus, agribusiness companies with
 no-identified-center-of-control are expected to
 have higher levels of interlocking with firms in
 the network and higher centrality scores.
 Financially controlled firms are under the
 strong direct control of financial institutions
 that are members of the network of firms
 studied. Any board representation resulting
 from this direct control is reflected at the net-
 work level in interlock counts and centrality
 scores. Because of this effect, financially con-
 trolled firms are expected to have higher cen-
 trality scores than companies under the other
 types of strong direct control. In addition,
 financial firms themselves tend to have rela-
 tively high scores. Given the weighted compu-
 tation of centrality scores, links to these firms
 will tend to contribute proportionately more to
 the scores of firms subject to financial control.
 Thus, these firms are expected to be an inter-
 mediate case with strong direct and network
 control.
 Two approaches are used to test the general
 hypothesis. The first employs a series of t-
 tests to compare mean centrality scores be-
 tween pairs of direct control types in each of
 the two networks. From the above discussion,
 firms with no-identified-center-of-control are
 expected to have higher mean centrality (and
 thus greater network control) than the other
 three types. Financially controlled firms are
 expected to have higher centrality scores
 than owner and cooperatively controlled com-
 panies. No hypothesis is made about the rela-
 tive centrality scores of owner and coopera-
 tively controlled firms.
 The results of these tests are presented in
 table 3. Four out of the five comparisons are
 8 Mixed and miscellaneous controlled firms are again excluded
 from the analysis.
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 Table 3. T-Ratios for Comparison of Mean
 Centrality Scores between Direct Control Types
 for Large Agribusiness Firms, 1976
 Strong
 Full Directional
 Pair of Control Types Compared Network Network
 No-identified-center/financial .89 .25
 No-identified-center/owner 3.52**a 2.54*
 No-identified-center/cooperative 4.80** 3.33**
 Financial/owner 3.74** 3.66**
 Financial/cooperative 5.78** 4.11**
 Owner/cooperative 6.39** 2.77*
 Note: All tests are one tail.
 a Double asterisk indicates significant at the 0.17% level. Using
 the Bonferroni procedure, this yields a 1% overall significance
 level for the family of six t-tests for each network; single asterisk
 indicates significant at the 0.83% level. Using the Bonferroni pro-
 cedure, this yields a 5% overall significance level for the family of
 six t-tests for each network.
 as expected in both networks. While firms
 with no-identified-center-of-control do not
 have significantly higher scores than finan-
 cially controlled firms in either network, their
 scores are significantly higher than those of
 owner- and cooperatively controlled firms. Fi-
 nancially controlled firms, in turn, have
 significantly higher scores than owner- and
 cooperatively controlled firms in both net-
 works. A final test indicates that owner-
 controlled firms have significantly higher cen-
 trality scores than cooperatives. These tests
 provide broad support for the hypothesis that
 weak direct control is associated with strong
 network control. This overall relationship
 holds for both the full and strong directional
 networks indicating that the results are not
 sensitive to network definition.
 The above approach does not control for
 differences in sizes of agribusiness firms under
 the various types of direct control. Recall that
 firms with no-identified-center-of-control and
 financially controlled firms are larger than
 owner- and cooperatively controlled firms.
 Size may be important in explaining differing
 centrality scores because previous studies
 have shown a positive relationship between
 firm size and degree of interlocking (Warner
 and Unwalla, Dooley, Allen). To assess the
 importance of this effect, a second approach
 to testing the general hypothesis is based on
 regressions relating centrality scores to type
 of direct control and size of firm. Size is ex-
 pected to have a positive effect on centrality
 scores, but the effect of direct control type on
 these scores should be independent of the size
 factor.
 A subsample of 154 of the 212 agribusiness
 firms included in the network analysis is used
 in the regressions. Of the 58 excluded firms, 16
 are under mixed or miscellaneous control, 25
 are cooperatives, and 17 are privately held
 firms under owner control. Among the latter
 two groups, centrality scores are uniformly
 low regardless of size. The total assets of pri-
 vate firms, for example, range from $33 mil-
 lion to $2,900 million, while their full network
 centrality scores range from 0.0 to 0.07 (on a
 scale of 0-1). Since there is little variability in
 scores among these firms, they are omitted
 from the analysis in order to provide a clearer
 test of the effect of size on level of centrality
 scores. The 154 firms in the subsample are all
 public including 88 that are owner controlled,
 23 financially controlled, and 43 with no
 identified center of control.
 The dependent variable in the regressions is
 the firm's centrality score in either the full or
 strong directional network. This score ranges
 f om 0 to 1. The results indicated that the vari-
 ance of centrality scores was unequal between
 firms under the three types of direct control.
 To stabilize the variance and correct for this
 problem, a logarithm to the base 10 transfor-
 mation was applied to the centrality scores
 (Mizruchi, pp. 109-37). The resulting scores
 for the transformed full (FCENTL) and strong
directional (SDCENTL) networks range from
 0 to 4.9
 The independent variables are firm size and
 type of direct control. Size (RLOGAST) is
 measured as the reciprocal of the logarithm to
 the base 10 of total assets in 1976 measured in
 millions of dollars (Hall and Weiss).to Since
 centrality scores are expected to be positively
 associated with firm size and assets appear in
 the denominator, RLOGAST is hypothesized
 to have a negative coefficient.
 As discussed earlier, financially controlled
 firms and firms with no-identified-center-of-
 control are hypothesized to have higher cen-
 trality scores than owner-controlled firms.
 Four variables were formed to test this hy-
 pothesis. A financial control dummy (FIN-
 9 The transformation is
 FCENTL, SDCENTL = log0o ((10,000 * CENTRALITY) + 1).
 See also Neter and Wasserman (p. 507).
 10 The results for regressions using operating revenues as the
 size variable were virtually identical to those reported here for
 assets.
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 DUM) and a dummy (NOIDDUM) for no-
 identified-center-of-control were created to
 assess whether the intercept term differs be-
 tween the direct control types. Positive
 coefficients on both these variables are hy-
 pothesized reflecting the higher levels of cen-
 trality scores expected for these control types
 compared to owner control. To assess
 whether the size coefficient differed among
 the control types, variables for financial con-
 trol/size (FINDUM * RLOGAST) and no
 identified center of control/size (NOIDDUM *
 RLOGAST) were created. No hypothesis is
 made on the signs of these two variables.
 Three models were tested for each network:
 (1) FCENTL, SDCENTL
 = a + b1 RLOGAST
 (2) FCENTL, SDCENTL
 = a + b1 RLOGAST + b2 FINDUM
 + b3 NOIDDUM
 (3) FCENTL, SDCENTL
 = a + b1 RLOGAST + b2 FINDUM
 + b3 NOIDDUM
 + b4 (FINDUM * RLOGAST)
 + b5 (NOIDDUM * RLOGAST).
 The results are reported in table 4.
 Size is highly significant in explaining differ-
 ences in centrality scores for public firms in all
 six regressions. For the full network, regres-
 sion (1) shows that the size variable alone ex-
 plains a substantial amount of variance. When
 the control dummies are added in regression,
 (2), both variables are positive and significant
 at the 5% level. Thus, differences remain in
 full network centrality scores by type of con-
 trol even after controlling for size. The results
 are mixed when the size coefficient is allowed
 to differ between control types in regression
 (3). The coefficient on FINDUM is positive
 but insignificant, while the coefficient on
 FINDUM * RLOGAST is negative and
 insi nificant. The negative coefficient on
 NOIDDUM is contrary to the hypothesis. The
 NOIDDUM * RLOGAST coefficient is posi-
 tive and significant, indicating a lower slope
 for firms with no identified center of control
 versus those with owner control. Taken to-
 gether, the three regressions for the full net-
 work suggest that size is very important in
 explaining differences in centrality scores
 between public firms; type of direct control is
 also significant.
 The results for the strong directional net-
 work reported in regressions (4)-(6) are simi-
 lar. Size is again a highly significant explana-
 tory variable in all three equations. The two
 control dummies are positive and significant
 when introduced alone but negative and
 insignificant when interaction terms between
 control type and size are included. Neither of
 the interaction terms is significant. Thus, al-
 lowing for differences in slope and intercept
 leads to an overall finding of no difference in
 centrality scores between firms with different
 types of direct control in both networks. How-
 ever, the regressions that include only dum-
 mies for control show a modest difference by
 control type. These results indicate that size is
 the important factor in explaining differences
 Table 4. Regression Relationship Between Centrality, Direct Control Type, and Asset Size for
 Public Firms, 1976
 Independent Variables
 Dependent FINDUM* NOIDDUM*
 Variable CONSTANT RLOGAST FINDUM NOIDDUM RLOGAST RLOGAST 2 F-value
 1) FCENTL 4.76**a -6.96** .26 55.11**
 (.36)b (.94)
 2) FCENTL 4.29** -6.18** .52* .35* .28 21.10**
 (.41) (.98) (.23) (.19)
 3) FCENTL 4.77** -7.38** .55 -1.40 -.26 4.94* .30 13.91**
 (.52) (1.28) (1.00) (.85) (2.69) (2.32)
 4) SDCENTL 4.38** - 7.22** .22 44.85**
 (.41) (1.08)
 5) SDCENTL 3.68** - 6.08** 1.07** .41* .30 22.51**
 (.45) (1.09) (.26) (.21)
 6) SDCENTL 4.18** -7.34** - .40 - .45 4.00 2.32 .30 13.93**
 (.58) (1.43) (1.12) (.95) (3.01) (2.60)
 a Double asterisk indicates significant at 1% level; single asterisk indicates significant at 5% level.
 b Standard errors are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients.
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 in centrality scores among public firms, al-
 though significant differences by type of con-
 trol appear to exist as well. The similarity in
 the regression results between the two net-
 works indicates that the network definition
 does not have an important impact for this
 sample of firms.
 The two approaches taken together provide
 broad support for the general hypothesis that
 weak direct control is associated with strong
 network control and vice versa, with size be-
 ing an important underlying factor. These re-
 sults clarify and qualify the earlier findings on
 dominant forms of direct control among large
 firms in the agribusiness sector. Over 60% of
 the firms in this study have strong direct con-
 trol without any substantial network ties. The
 owner- and cooperatively controlled firms that
 make up this group appear to be relatively in-
 dependent decision makers. Corporate control
 is largely internal to the firm, and manage-
 ment's policy parameters are set by the con-
 trolling stockholders.
 The nearly 20% of the agribusiness firms
 that lack any center of direct control have the
 highest levels of exposure to network control.
 These include the larger firms in the sector. In
 these firms, the ability of management to set
 its own course appears to be limited by the
 strength of outside interests represented on
 the board. Depending on the relative power of
 management and outside interests, the locus
 of control in these corporations may be inter-
 nal, external, or shared. Leaving aside the
 10% that are mixed or miscellaneously con-
 trolled, the final 10% of the agribusiness com-
 panies are under strong direct control by
 financial firms coupled with high levels of net-
 work involvement. In these special cases,
 both forms of control are externally centered
 in a financial firm. For all the direct control
 types considered, data on network control is
 most important in clarifying and qualifying the
 nature of corporate control in firms that have
 no-identified-center of direct control.
 Conclusions
 A mixed picture of the dominant forms of
 corporate control for large agribusinesses
 is drawn by this research. Over half of
 these firms are under strong direct owner
 control with decision making under stockhold-
 ers' internal control. Cooperative control is an
 important secondary class of strong direct
 control with cooperatives showing little con-
 ec ion through board membership to other
 centers of power in th  national economy.
 This lack of connection is much gr ater than
 that of owner-controlled firms. The largest
 firms in the sector lack direct control but show
 much higher levels of exposure to network
 control. For these top firms network-based
 control appears to take the placeof direct con-
 trol by owners." Financially controlled firms
 form a unique secondary class of control with
 both strong direct and network control.
 Two points emerge from this article to guide
research on the effects on firm performance
 and aggregate concentration of patterns of
 corporate control over large firms in the ag-
 ribusiness and other sectors. First, consider-
 ing patterns of direct control through stock-
 holding will not offer a comprehensive picture
 of who controls firm decision making. Evi-
 dence presented here, for example, indicates
that by 1976 management control rather than
 strong direct stockholder control was predom-
 inant among the largest firms in the ag-
 ribusiness sector. However, this weak direct
 control was accompanied by strong outside
 network control. Thus, managerial control ap-
 pears to encourage overall coordination in the
 sector rather than being a decentralizing fac-
 tor. Alternatively, both public- and private
 owner-controlled firms along with coopera-
 tives are more independent decision-making
 centers. Research emphasizing the quality of
firm-level decision making must address the
 structure of both direct and network control.
 Second, the structure of corporate control,
 in the agribusiness sector at least, is depen-
 dent on firm size. Size was the major factor in
 xplaining the type of direct control and the
 l v l of network involvement. Larger firm size
 is related to looser forms of direct control but
 more extensive network influence. This im-
 plies greater centralization of decision making
 s firms grow to larger sizes.
 [Received August 1985; final revision
 received April 1986.]
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